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on ll'EU und Europeun defence: beyond Amsterdant
The Assembll,,
(, Welcorning the resumption of debate. following the initiatives by France and the United
Kingdom that led to the Saint Malo process, on how a security and defence Europe might be
achieved:
fii1 Welcoming the Rome Declaration of the WEU Ministerial Council meeting held under the
Italian Presidency and the conclusions of the European Council sumrnit in Vienna held under the
Austrian Presidency;
(iii) Welcoming also both ltaly's initiative in organising the first WEU/EU Forum in Rome to ex-
amine ways in r"'hich the two organisations can cooperate more closely and the Council's decision to
initiate informal reflection ln WEU on the question of Europe's security and defence.
1it') Convinced that it is necessary to seize the opportunity offered by the various initiatives that
are under way in order to make qualitative progress in that direction:
6,) Stressing that European nations must show they are resolved to assume greater defence re-
sponsibilities and reduce their dependence on the United States:
(vi1 Convinced that Europe can take on greater responsibilities in the interests of the E,uro-Atlantic
community as a whole only if the ESDI is developed outside as well as inside NATOI
(r'ii) Reaffirrning its conviction that the European Union must be the fulcrum of an effective di-
mension in the field of Europeau securitl, and defence 
- 
such a dimension now having been largely
achieved in the economic sphere and currently in the making in that of the CFSP;
(t,iii) Considering, nonetheless, that to create a defence dimension within the European Union de-
mands a fundamental change in policy' thinking on the part of some metnber states as to the nature
and purpose of that Union:
(ir) Taking note of the point of view according to rvhich European Union decisions on security
and defence must be taken on an intergovernmental basis. while stressing from the outset that this
cannot be done without makingthe appropriate arrangenrents for parliamentary'democratic scrutiny:
(x) Pointing out that an1' direct assumption of security and defence responsibilities by the Euro-
pean Union must not on an)'account be achieved by watering dorvn European security or calling the
European defence project into question. and must therefore respect WEU's achievements and the
agreements that WEU has concluded with NATO and the European Union:
(xi) Noting that a transfer of powers of decision from WEU to the European Union could have the
advantage of reducing the number of decision-making procedures required within the European insti-
tutions and thus make a positive contribution towards facilitating the emergence of a consensus and a
common political resolve:
(xii) Supporting in consequeuce any proposal designed to give the European Union an autonomous
capability for decision-making and action, provided that such proposal ensures that:
(u) all European commitments to collective defence and close cooperation with NATO are
preserved,
(b) defence ministers are involved in the decision-making process, as is currently the posi-
tion in WEU:
(c) the rights the WEU associate member and associate partner countries have acquired to
participate in the Organisation and its Assernbly are preserved in full:
DOCUMENT I636
kl) a polic)'on defence expenditure is worked out that is commensurate with the role Europe
intends to assume as an independent and responsible play'er on the u'orld stage;
(e) a common industrial armaments policy is developed on the basis of WEAG. WEAO and
OCCAR achievements:
0 there continues to be democratic scrutiny at European level. through a parliamentary as-
sembly'formed of delegations from the national parliaments of the countries concerned. such
as is currently exercised by the WEU Assembll':
(xiii) Stressing that if Europe is to have the desired ability to take decisions. provision for inde-
pendent situation analysis, intelligence and planning capabilities is a necessity and does not constitute
needless duplication of NATO assets,
(xit') Recalling that any decision on the part of the European Council uith a view to achieving a
comrnon defence in the framework of the European Union irnplies amendrnent of the existing 1'reaties
and must therefore 
- 
even if it can be taken without first convening an intergovernmental conf-erence
- 
be submitted to member parliaments for ratification, requiring careful preparation. in close consul-
tation with the relevant parliamentarl' authorities;
(xt') Convinced therefore that, initially, it is possible and preferable to achieve the objectives set by
the various initiatives and in particular those referred to at Saint Malo. bl'reference to the existing
Treaties and in pafticular by making greater use of the modified Brussels Treaty in the service of the
European Union,
(rvi) Persuaded nevertheless that it is for WEU to develop a strategv for achieving a security' and
defence Europe and envisage short-. medium- and long-term nreasures to be put to the European
Councill
(rt'ii| Convinced therefore that a concerted effort must nou' be nrade to identify areas where the ex-
isting Treaties require revision with a vierv to improving cooperation and encouraging greater con-
vergence between WEU and the European Union and thus preparing for the integration of the trvo
organisations and their Treaties:
(xt,iii) Recalling in consequence the proposals contained in Recommendation 61.1 on Maastricht II,
rvith parlicular regard to the plan for gradually' integrating WEU into the European Union on the basis
of the document submitted to the European Union, on 2I Marclt 1997^ by six of its member states:
(xir) Stressing in that context that, in a democratic Europe, the prerogatives of governments should
be confined to the executive sphere and that all matters pertaining to arrangements for democratic
scrutiny can be worked out and decided only rvith the full involvemeut and agreernent of the relevant
parliarnentarl autlrorities.
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL
1. Support the Saint Malo process by encouraging the Europearl governments to complete their
work so that the results can be presented at the rninisterial meeting in Bremen and included in the
European Council discussions in Cologne:
2. Contribute, in the context of short-term measures, to effofts to improve and strengthen
Europe's autonomous decision-making capability by putting at the CFSP's disposal all the means the
modified Brussels Treaty makes available, together ivith all WEU's achievements, and encouraging
the CFSP to make full use thereof;
3. Accordingly assign the responsibility for action in the field of crisis management to the Euro-
pean Union, providing it with the necessary means in an effective and credible way, and to that end
draw up the appropriate agreements on any legal and institutional adjustments;
DOCUMENT I636
4. La1' dorvn the fbundations, as of now, of a process designed to provide the European Union
witlr a real, operational military capability and decision-making powers in the areas covered by
WEU's remit;
5. Take steps to ensure that the European Union will maintain an intrinsically European opera-
tional capabilitl'. equaI at least to that on which WEU can drau' at present, without prejudice to the
use of NATO assets or other means, and as a result, rule out anl,plan to incorporate WEU's military
functions in NATOI
6. Make sure that the effect of an1' transfer of powers of decision or action to the institutional
framervork of the European Union does not preserve solely the nrilitary side of crisis management
u'hile letting collective defence fall by the ual,side:
7. Accordingly develop a medium-term programme, for gradually bringing about the integration
of all the areas covered by'WEU's remit into the intergovernmental framervork of the European Un-
ion:
either in the form of a fourth pillar:
or under the CFSP, as and rvhen all the participant nations are ready for it, and as the CFSP
matures:
8. Prepare a long-term plan for gradually achieving a true common defence under the aegis of the
European Union, and propose to the E,uropean Council:
(a) that the necessar)' steps are taken, in that process, to secure the safeguard of all that can
today be counted as EU. NATO and WEU achier,'ements in this area:
ft) that the coordination, liaison and cooperation machiner)' presently used .by NATO and
WEU continue to be used between NATO and the new' European institutional frarnework;
(c.) that the mutual assistance clause enshrined in Arlicle V of the modified Brussels Treaty
becotne an integral part of the revised Treaty' on European Union and not merelv an option
contained in a separate protocol,
(d) that it negotiate an agreement rvith WEU over those aspects of the modified Brussels
Treatv. other than the rnutual assistance clause and the NATO cooperation clause (Article IV).
that are to be included in any revised Treaty on Europearr Union: and
(c) that when WEU's porvers are trausferred to the European Union. the latter guarantee that
tlre WEU associate member and paftner countries u'ill continue to enjoy the rights of participa-
tion they currently have in WEU:
9. Guarantee that until such time as any final decision is reached on the arrangements for the
dentocratic scrutinl' of European defence activities, the WEU Assembll' can continue to carr), out that
furrction:
10. Support all initiatives b1'the Assembly to convene a parliamentary conference uith a vierv to
drafting proposals on arrangements for the democratic scrutiny of security and defence Europe.
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Explonutory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr de Puig, President of the ,Assembly and Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. The debate on the creation of a Defence
Europe has been reopened. before the Amster-
dam Treaty has even taken effect. and at the
heart of that debate, once again. lies the future
of WE,U. The French President. Mr Chirac, rvas
the first to advocate. in a speech delivered at the
end of August 1998. that WEU"s future should
be decided after NATO's Washington Summit,
possibly at a WEU summit held back-to-back
with a European Council meeting. He proposed
at that juncture that. when the time rvas ripe. a
Council of European Defence Ministers shoLrld
be set up. WEU's future role would be that of
E,uropean Union Defence Agency and the Or-
ganisation uould be gradually integrated into
the institutions of the Union'.
2. A short time after, the British Govern-
ment launched an initiative that sought to ensure
the European Union had a military capability'to
draw on. This represented a fundamental change
as colnpared with the stauce taken by its pre-
decessor. The Blair Government's change of
thinking on European def-euce was based on a
confidential paper a senior UK Foreign Office
official, Robert Cooper, rvas asked to draft in
May 1998. rvith a view to assessing the poten-
tial future for Britain in E,urope. According to
press reports'. a key recommendation was "us-
ing British military assets to develop a Euro-
pean capacity to act independently in the de-
fence field. As defined by the Cabinet Office
this means dropping WEU and building a Euro-
pean defence capacity' within NATO". An
afticle by Clrarles Grant. Director of the Centre
for European Reform, published on 9 Septem-
ber 1998 and entitled "Can Britain lead in
Europe?" provides an illustration of how such
' Agnnrn France Presse, 26 August 1998. On 3
September 1998. the French Prime Minister, Mr
Jospin. took up these suggestions in his address to the
Instilut des hautes dtudes de ddfense nattonale'. "...
holding a WEU/European Council back-to-back
summit and the creation. when the time is ripe, of a
European Council of Defence Ministers are
proposals that should be thrashed out rvith our
partners".
2 The Guardtan.2T October 1998.
an initiative might be implemented. Here. the
author puts forward the vierv that the situation
"post-Amsterdanr" offered Britain an opportu-
nity to increase its influence in Europe, noting
that:
"ln the spring of 1998 Mr Blair began to
talk of Britain taking a lead on European
defence. He may have realised that, if the
British could appear to be better Euro-
peans in this area, they might win consid-
erable credit with their partners and that,
in the strange rvorld of EU politics, it is
possible to buy'good rvill by making con-
cessions that are more svrnbolic than
substantial".
3. Grant f-eels in this connection that "what
Britain needs to do is find ways of strengtheninu
European defence without damaging NATO or
upsetting the Americans". Given that context he
suggests. inter qlio, that: "Britain should pro-
pose abolishing WEU. Its political function
would merge w'ith the European Union. becom-
ing a 'fourth pillar'. ... Its military functions
rvould be subsurned into NATO. Article V of
the WEU Treaty, obliging members to defend
each other tiom attack. and enforceable only
through NATO. rvould be transferred to the
fourth pillar. E,uropean defence ministers
should meet as an EU Council. They could in-
struct NATO's European forces to take parl in
EU military missions".
4. The aLrthor considers that "these reforrns,
by finally settling the question of E,urope's de-
fence identity, should convince everyone that
NATO has a future as E,urope's only function-
ing military organisation". Nevertheless, "some
Americans do have reservations about this
scheme, for it would inevitably lead to a Euro-
pean caucus within NATO". But, again accord-
ing to Grant. "... top Pentagon officials believe
that a European calrcus within NATO is a price
worth paying for a scheme which offers the
prospect of a more coherent European CFSP,
and of a stronger and longer-lasting NATO" .
5. It was at an informal meeting of the
European Council on 24 and 25 October 1998 at
Pcirlschach, Austria, that Mr Blair made his
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statement olt the United Kingdom's revised
position. No olficial text uas released of the
contributions made by those present at the Port-
schach sumrnit, but press repofts reveal that it
was the British Prime Minister u,ho introduced
the debate on securitl'and defence policy.
6. It would appear that he used his address
to erplain to his colleagues that the Kosovo
crisis had shorvn that the Fifieen should be able
to deploy rnilitary capabilitl' at their borders,
especially when the United States did not rvish
to becorne involved. He appears to have argued
that three solutions were open to the Fifteen:
developing a E,uropean Securitl, and Defence
Identitl' ri ithin NATO: merging WEU and the
European Union and finding a \!a)' in rvhich
WEU, NATO and the E,uropean Union could
work in conjunction with one another. In a press
conference he gave on 25 October 1998, Mr
Blair made the point that:
"We are at the verv beginning of that de-
bate. ue need to get the institutional
mechanisrn right. w'e need to make sure
that that institutional rnechanism in no
\\'a) undermines NATO but rather is
complementan'to it".
In a speech he gave in Edinburgh on 13 Nor,-
ember 1998. Mr Blair explained the United
Kingdom's nerv position as fbllows:
"NATO is above all a transatlantic alli-
ance. US and Canadian commitrnent to
Europe's defence has been at the heart of
our security and prosperitv for 50 y'ears.
We must work to keep them engaged in
the future as in the past. Shoulder to
shoLrlder.
But Etrrope has alrvays been the u'eaker of
the tuin pillars of the Alliance, both irr its
abilitl,to decide rapidh' and its capability
to put those decisions into actron. Our US
allies hal'e often called for more equal
burden-sharing. Thel have not alrvays
been keen to see a greater European iden-
titl'of vierv.
As I have already'told m1 European Union
colleagues, Europe's fbreign policy, r'oice
in the rvorld is unacceptably muted and
ineffective, given our economic weight
and strategic interests. In Kosovo, we once
again shorved ourselves hesitant and dis-
united.
We must change this. b1' ensuring that the
EU cctn speak rvith a single. authoritative
voice on the key international issues of the
day' and can intervene eff-ectively ivhere
necessary.
At Amsterdam, European leaders agreed
on ne\\' political instruments 
- 
a so-called
Mr CFSP and a new planning capability.
They' will certainly' help.
But they' u'ill not be enough. Diplomacy
works best rvhen backed by, the credible
threat of force. The maxim applies to Eur-
ope too. Europe needs to develop the abil-
ity to act alone in circumstanceswhere, for
whatel'er reason, the US is not able or does
not u'ish to participate. Why should US
taxpayers and US troops always have to
resolve problerns on our doorstep?
This does not rnean duplicating NATO,
creating a European standing army, or
moving aual' from intergovernmental de-
cision-making. But it does mean two
things:
flrst. rapid and compreherrsive im-
plementation of the European identity'
in NATO agreed in Berlin at the be-
ginning of 1996. We need a European
decision-rnaking capacity and com-
mand structure rvhich can operate rap-
idly and effectively if necessary:
second, proper decision-making struc-
tures in the EU. headed by' E,uropean
Council readiness to take strategic de-
cisions on Europe-only operations.
Europe needs genuine military, operational
capability 
- 
not least forces able to react
quickly and w'ork together effectively 
-
and genuine political u'ill. Without these,
rve rvill always be talking about an empty
shell.
But we also need to check the institutions
are right. To decide horv the EU. WEU and
NATO can best mesh together. We have
DOCUMENT I636
no preconceptions. Ratlrer we want a new
debate. It would be good to see some
emerging conclusions by the Washington
Summit.
A stronger, more effective Europe in for-
eign policy and security uill benefit our
Norlh Atlantic allies. It should strengthen
NATO, and strengthen Europe. That is our
aim."
II. Progress in the debate
on Europeon securi1,following the British
Prime Minister's in iliotive
7 . The most clear-cut of the various reac-
tions on the part of European nations to the
British initiative has been that of President
Chirac who, at the Prjnschach summit, took up
the suggestion he had made in ALrgust. recalling
that if a decision were reached that Europeans
should intervene, the defence ministers of the
E,uropean Union would need to be able to meet
under conditions yet to be specified. They
needed the support of a specialist agency to
draw up a plan of campaign. That task at present
falls to WEU, which would gradually' change
and be integrated into the European Union insti-
tutions. Two routes might be envisaged for
implementing any future intervention under the
aegis of the E,uropean Union: recourse to
NATO's European chain of command or a coal-
ition of European states. as in the case of Alba-
niat.
8. During the informal meeting of the de-
fence ministers of the fifteen European Union
member states held in Vienna on 3 and 4 Nol'-
ember 1998, the United Kingdom Deferrce
Minister again stressed NATO's importance and
the need not to undermine it, and referred to
four options, none of them. in his view, straight-
forward. They consisted of:
a merger between WEU and the Euro-
pearr Union:
nrerging some parts of WEU with the
EU and others with NATO;
the creation of a more distinct Euro-
pean dimension within NATO;
3 Bttlletin Quoticlten
ober 1998.
reorganising and breathing new life
into WEUa.
9. The gathering momentum of the debate
led the WEU Council of Ministers, meeting irt
Rome on l6 and l7 November 1998. to express
the wish "that a process of informal reflection
be initiated at WEU on the question of E,urope's
security and defence in the perspective of the
entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and of
the Washington Summit". The Ministers stress-
ed on this occasiorr that such a reflection should
serve the interests of all WEU nations.
10. At the Franco-Gerrnan summit on I Dec-
ember 1998. the two countries agreed to mobi-
lise for prevention and rnanagetnent of regional
crises and. to that end. to seek out ways to allorv
the European Union access to the operational
capabilities it lacked. either by providing it with
European assets of its own or bv making NATO
assets available to it under the agreements
reached at the Berlin Atlantic Council. They
also agreed to give thought to what they' re-
garded as the desirable process of integrating
WEU into the European Union.
I 1. The debate took a nerv turn at the Franco-
British summit held in Saint Malo. on 4 Dec-
ember 1998s. where the heads of state and of
government on both sides agreed on certain
basic principles as follows:
the European Council must be in a
position to take decisions concerning a
common defence policy within the
framervork of the CFSP:
those decisions must be taken on an
intergovernmental basis;
Europeans must operate within the
institutional framework of the Euro-
pean Union where it u'ould be neces-
sary to schedule meetings of defence
ministers:
the European Union must have the
capacity for autorromous action. back-
ed up by suitable structures and cred-
ible military forces, rvithout unneces-
sary duplication rvith NATO:
1 Atlantic Neu's, lVo 3055.5 November 1998.
-' See full text of the Saint Malo declaration attached
as an appendrx.
Europe, No. 7330,26-2'7 Oct-
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Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
and Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty mr.rst be retained:
the Union should be able to have re-
course to NATO or other external
military means,
the differing situations of European
countries, particularly in relation to
NATO, must be respected.
12. American Government reaction can be
gauged from an article which appeared in the
Finqnciol Times on 7 December last. In it,
American Secretary' of State Albright6 empha-
sised that any' institutional change must remain
in line with the principles of the Atlantic part-
nership. Three pitfalls, rvhich she referred to as
the three Ds. were in her view therefore to be
avoided:
decoupling: the European decision-
making process should not be un-
hooked from broader Alliance deci-
sion-making;
cluplicution: between NATO and the
European Union, and
discriminulron: against NATO mem-
bers that were ltot EU members.
13. However, more important still is the need
to evaluate the impact of the new debate in
E,urope in the context of the preparations for the
NATO Summit. where a decision is to be taken
on the Atlantic Alliance's nerv political mission
and Strategic Concept. In this connection, the
European Allies hal'e to contend rvith proposals
put forward by Mrs Albright to the effect that
the Alliance must build up NATO's preventive
and protective capabilities against nerv threats 
-
such as weapons of mass destruction, drugs and
terrorism 
- 
even if such threats might emanate
from regions outside the NATO area and are not
normally part of the organisation's traditional
area of responsibility. Here the United States
has already run into opposition from some of its
European allies. in particular France.
14. When the European Council met in
Vienna on l2 December 1998, the heads of state
and of government of the Fifteen took no deci-
t' See also her intervierv with
I 998.
sions of an institutional nature. However they
rvelcomed "the new impetus given to the debate
on a common European policy on securitl, and
defence" and more especialll' the Saint Malo
declaration. The heads of state and of govern-
ment considered "that in order for the European
Union to be in a position to play its full role on
the international stage the CFSP must be backed
bv credible operational capabilities". At the
same time they underlined that the "rein-
forcement of European solidarity must take into
accor.lnt the l'arious positions of European
states, including the obligations of some mem-
ber states rvithin NATO". Lastly the European
Council invited the new Germau Presidency to
firrther the debate on the basis of discussions in
WEU and the European Union and resolved to
re-examine the issue of CFSP development at
the Cologne Summit on 3 and 4 June 1999.
15. On l8 February, 1999, the German De-
fence Minister, Mr Scharping, announced that
the German Presidency would put forward a
proposal, after the Washington NATO Summit
in April, for integrating WEU in the European
Union. While recognising the difficulties that
had to be resolved to achieve this objective, the
minister did not rule out the prospect of the
European Council's reaching a decision in prin-
ciple about integration at the European Summit
to be held in Cologne. The necessary details
could be sorted out between now and the end of
the year 2000'.
IlL Assessnrenl of the possible consequences
of the new situation
16. The Maastricht Treaty' set out the deci-
sion by the Fifteen (subsequently restated in the
Amsterdam Treaty) to frame a common defence
policy, that might lead to a commoll defence,
but did not stipulate a time-frame within which
this might be achieved. Two verv different fears
prevented any firm decisions being taken in this
area:
that tiequently expressed by the
United Kingdom and shared to vary-
ing extents by' many Union members,
that too strong an affirmation of a




European defence policl'uould un-
dermine NATO and the United States
comm itrnent to E,urope:
that raised by Finland aud Srveden and
to an extent also by' Austria and Ire-
land. that it woLrld constitute too
abrupt a challenge to the policies of
neutralitl, that thel' had follorved for
some -10 or 50 r'ears under diff-erent
reqirnes. Added to rvhich. some smal-
ler po\\ ers. Dennrark in particular,
feared being dragged by' their larger
European ncishbours into military
adventures in u,hich they had no rvish
to get involved. It must be emphasised
that all the WEU observers are w'illing
to contribute to the dcbate on the
development of a stronger CFSP. but
thev also make clear that the future
activities in rvhich they w ill bc
involved rvill only be those specified
in the Amsterdam Treatl.
Despite the fhct that their position on
the rnatter presents discernible differ-
ences. ther are united b1 the fact that
the sitLration as it is todal'. on the eve
of the entrf into force of the Amster-
dam Treatr, sits u'ell riith their for-
eign policies.
The centrality given by the Amster-
darn Treatv to the so-called Petersberg
tasks resulted from a Srvedish-Finnish
proposal. and the "opt-out" provision
laid dori'n in the treaty, granting wide
rooln for manoeuvre. allorvs those
couutries greater t-lexibilitl' rvith re-
gard to their internal political situa-
tions.
Abrupt changes. such as the approval
of a time-frame for bringing in a
common defence policl, could. at this
particular tirne. hat e domestic conse-
quences for solne of the observer
countries in terms of political stabilitl,
and pLrblic sLrpporl. The decision taken
on l2 Janr-rarr 1999 b1'a special Com-
nrittee set up bv Srveden to endorse
that countrl''s rejection of any form of
rnilitarl alliance should theretbre be
seen in this light.
17. These t$o sets of f-ears have obr,iously
not evaporated and rvill undoubtedly surfhce
uhen it comes to preparin_q the decisions the
European Council is to take in 1999. British
intervention in Iraq alonqside the United States
in Deceurber 1998. u'ithout the UK's partners
being properly consulted. canuot but raise ques-
tirrns about rv hether Britain's priorities realll,
have changed: at the sanre time the lack of a UN
mandate fbr this undeftakins has sen'ed to iu-
crease uon-aligned suspicions about the initia-
tives larger po\\'ers are likely,to take. u,ithin and
outside NATO or WEU.
18. Moreoler. N'lrs Albright's references to
US objectives in relation to NATO reflorm. on
uhich a decision is due in spring 1999, neces-
sarill' raise the question as to the roorn thev
uould leave fbr a European securitl' polic1,. in-
asmuch that thel' aim ou the one hand to extcnd
the organisation's responsibilities into lte\\
areas 
- 
specifically the fight asainst terrorisltr.
dnrss and the proliferation of ABC llcapons 
-
and rvould additionalll, har'e the efl-ect ol re-
rnovinq the geographic boundaries assigned to
mutual assistance by the signatories of the
Washington Treatl,t and lastll because thev also
allorv for the possibilitl of militarl'operations
not legitirnated b1 Unrted Nations mandate.
19. Such corrsiclc-rations lead us to rvonder
rvhether the British. uho clearlv did consult
rvith the Anrericans befbre presentinu their pro-
posals on European sccurity. have an1'thine
more iu rnind than strengtlrening transatlantic
ties fufther b1'tLrrning Europe iuto an instrurnent
in the service of an Alliance rvith wider po\\ers.
b1' ensuring in other rvords that any' genuiuell'
E,uropeau defence and securitl' organisation re-
nrained devoid of any' air.n or substance. lt
should be recalled that the information initialll'
released on the British proposals boiled dorrn to
the dernise of WEU and a shelling out of its re-
sponsibilities betu,een NATO and the Europearr
Uniou. rvith NATO inhentins its rnilitarr struc-
tures. in other uords an\ assets that uould
allow' E,urope to undertake rnilitan' actiou out-
side NA'l-O. uhile its political responsibilities 
-
llholll' residual uhcn not underpinned b1, any,
means of enfbrcement 
- 
fell to the European
Union. If. in xhat folloued. the British state-
nrent laid rnore ernphasis ou the European
dimension of the United Kingdorn's proposals.
it remained extrernelv vague about their sub-
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stauce. At the Vieuna European CoLrncil on I I
and 12 December 1998. it uas stated that ex-
changes of views in this area uould continue.
but no reference rvas r.nade to '*'ELI's intesra-
tion in the European Union.
20. The docunrent released follou ing the
Franco-British talks irr Saint Malo on -l Decem-
ber 1998 is seerninglv a declaration ol inteut in
tarour of organising Er"rropean det-euce uithin
the European Union. Horvever. it is very im-
precise about hou responsibilities aud assets
uould bc shared betueen NATO and the Euro-
pean Union. as lt states that such division rvould
avoid unnecessar) dLrplication. This is inter-
preted fronr the British stance as ruling out any'
duplication whatsoever. uhile the French take
the l'ieu' that anything that strengthens E,urope's
independent capabilities uould be useful and
should therefore be sLrpported.
21. The Saint Malo projc'ct envisages the Eur-
opean Union acquiring defencc capabilitic-s and
responsibilities. thus opening up the possibility'
of WEU being incorporated into a E,uropean
Union intergovernrrental pillar. the CFSP. in
conjuuction with the developrnent of the ESDI
u ithin NATO.
22. I-lowevcr thc Saint Malo declaration rules
out an)' responsibilitl in this area for the Euro-
pean Conrr.r.rission and the E,uropean Parliarnent.
(The British hare rloreover rejected au1' plan to
set up a European arml'). Therefore at present it
does not constitute a plan fbr the integration of
the def-ence dinrension in the European Union irr
anl'real sense.
23. The Saint Malo declaration states that Ar-
ticle V of the modified Brussels Treaty, should
be retained but does not rnake clear whether it
should be incorporated into a ue\! Treaty' orr
European Union or uhether it rrould be pref-er-
able to keep the rnodified Brussels -freatr. The
declaration also refers to "credible" nrilitarl
forces but does not definc thc position of the
tuo signatories as regards the forces ther con-
sider shoLrld corne under direct European Union
cornrnand and separable but not separate NATO
fbrces. Hou,ever it should be remembered that
Saint Malo is not the outcorne but the staft of a
consultation process between France and the
United Kingdonr that is still going on.
24. Moreover. information obtained fiom
British sources uould appear to suggest that the
United States protested to the British aLrthorities
about the excessive concessions the latter were
said to have made to French '"'ieus rn tlrat re-
spect. The United Kinedorn's handline of the
Iraqi affair leads to the couclusion that the abso-
Iute prioritl, Britain gives to NATO and the
American Alliance rernains unaltered and that
UK intentions arc primarilv directed torvards
facrlitating France's return to the tbld of the
NATO joint rnilitarv conrrnands in l'ieu of the
opening created in this direction thoLrgh the set-
trns-up of a NATO force in FYROM to protect
nrembers of the OSCE Kosolo verification rnis-
s ion.
25. Onc- rnight uonder uhether France 
- 
al-
thoLrgh it has. it rrould appear. corne round tcl
the idea of taking its place once again in the
NATO joint commands. a process begun back
in 1996 
- 
ma)'not hale reserrations regardinu
that course of action. It uas disappointed at not
having obtained an) concessions in respor)se to
its requests tbr a tairer distribution of rnilitary
responsibilities in NATO betrveen E,urope ernd
the United States. and also uith the relatir,e lack
of supporl from its European allies in that con-
nection. Fufthermore one ef'fect of France's sts-
tem of political "cohabitation" seenrs to be that
the French President and the French Gor'-
ernment constantly' r,ie rvith another as to uho
can adopt the most independent stance in rela-
tion to the United States. Not only is the intro-
duction of the euro presented as a challenge to
the dollar. but leading socialists. in parlicLrlar
lVIr Jospin and Mr Richard. have repeatedly
commented publicll. both in the context of Iraq
and of the Atlantic Alliance. on the United
States' overll' dourinant position in NATO and
its excessivell' rigid interpretatiorr. in theorr and
iu practice, of its leadership role in the Alliarrce.
notu'ithstanding its stated iutention of aclriev'ing
a better balauce in transatlautic relatiorrs.
26. Mr Richard. on the assurnption that reser-
vations concerning the Iraqi operation brought
France and its E,uropean partners closer toge-
ther. uas uncharacteristically open about Frenclr
thinking regardinu the international order. u'hen
he stated. in a panel discussion broadcast on
radio and pLrblished in Le illorde on 6 January'.
that the airn uas for that order to be based on
"multi-polarity" 
- 
an idea floated on several
occasior.rs in Decernber by French spokesrren
,uvith a role iu foreign policy' matters. The matter
l0
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\\as also raised by the Gerrran I"oreign lVlrnis-
ter. NIr Fischer. as the representative of the IlLi
Chaimanship-in-Otfice of the Council. in his
address to the European Parliarnent on 12 Jan-
uar1, 1999. Here he advocated that "in the nrLrlti-
polar w'orld of the 2lst centurl. the EU nrust be
a plal,er that was able to conduct its oun inde-
peudent policy".
21. Suclt an approach is diametricalll, op-
posed to the thinking of the Aurericau authori-
ties. in particular the r,'ie*s l'oiced b1 President
Clinton and above all b1' NIrs Albright, on the
sLrbjects of lracl. the LJnited Nations and NATO
reforn.t. lt is bccom ins increasingly clear to
American eles that the international order nrust
be orqanised around a single polar structure
rooted in NATO. uith a reduced role lbr the
United Nations uhich is regarded as irrelflcient
in underpinning the international orclcr.
28. The tu'o positions are ulore stronslv and
c learlr,' delineated than thel' ha'v e cver beeu
since the time of General de Gaulle and Presi-
deut Kenuedl'. The French are right in their per-
ception that to atflnr E,urope in anr, uar is to
challen{-rc the United States. but perhaps \\rong
in saving so. givcn the latter is a dorninant pow-
er. 'l'hat point of vieu is shared b1 the British.
r.lho jLrdge it pruderrt to toue doun and if pos-
sible avoid anv challenges of this nature. Seen
in this light. the euro. rf successful. in other
rvords if it leads to a shakc-up of the inter-
national Inonetar) sYstern in terms of a "rnulti-
polar" understanding that allou's E,urope to
corne into its oun, uould notch up a substantial
triurnph for France's rvorld vision. In the rnolre-
tarl sphere. the signs are that a European entitl
rrill suitllv emerse. forcing the United States to
negotiate rvith E,urope on an equal fboting in the
uhole sphere of econonric aftairs. Such success
u,ill not however have anv direct irnpact on
defence.
29. Indeed, the French uould be uronq to
assLlure that tbreign policl and det-ence can be
handled in the sanre \\a\. They are failing to
take account of the fact that. although in eco-
nornic terms European interests by' and large
tend to converge. thcre is no columotl European
perceptiou rr ith regard to a foreign and defence
policl aud that France rs. in the eles of many of
its E,uropean partners. every bit as suspect as- if
not rnore so than the United States lvhen it
coures to seeking to drar,r Europeans into uncler-
takings of rihich thel,ri'ant no part.'l-hc French
also fail to grasp that uofthern European coun-
tries feel little affinity fbr tlte N'lcciiterrancan
concenls tlrat are of major inrpoftance to tlrcrr
southern Europeau brethren. and to the Llnited
States.
30. Moreovcr the Anrericans and the British
arc quite right tt) think that Arnerican poucr is
such that Europe. eren il united. could neler
cottduct a forciqn policl' that uas too far out of
step u'ith the [Jnitccl States. While the latter rnay'
encourage Europcans to inr'est nrore heavily, in
their o*n defence. it does so saf'e in the knou-
ledge that Arnerica is so far ahead of Er.rrope
that it uould take light-1ears tor thcnr to catclr
tup attd that Europcetn countrics includins.
France 
- 
have no desire n hertsocvcr in thc pres-
ent clirnate to jeopardise the r ery substantral
ettorts thev are currently' making. iu partrcular
to guarantee the euro's financial succcss. in
order to increase their det-ence bud_qets. \\Iestcrn
Errropean nations (not counting Greece anc'l Tur-
key') spend approxinrateh l.9% ol GNP on
det-ence. as against the US's 3.3%. Conse-
quently'. they' are hardll, inclined to risk their
monc) on a Europeau defence policl that runs
cor,rnter to stout Anrericarr resolve. althou-qh
tueitlter are thel prepared. in vieu of ever-grorv-
in-{ American clorninance. to turn their backs
cotnpletelv on the prospect of such a polic1,.
runless force-c[ to br the LJnrted Statcs.
31. Under such circurnstances. it is hardll
surprising that the British initiative is read dif-
f-erentll from one European country to the ue.rt
and oue uonders uhethcr tlrc tinrc is in fnct ripe
tbr a shake-up of the West's cristing securitv
and def-ence slstenr. After the Vienna Surnnrit it
nlal, prove difficult to rernove the i:suc ol
European defence from the agenda tbr negrrtia-
tions betueen EU urernbers. bLrt their conrple-
tion bcfore the NATO Surnnrit decides rrhat
rlrcasures are to be taken in the NATO fiame-
work rvould appear to be ruled out. Onlr after
those nrc-asurc's have been taken u ill Europeans
knorv u'hat roonr thev hare fbr rnanoeu\re, If it
is unlikell to bc r er) great and substantial
changes rnal ueed to takc place in certair.r coun-
tlies' policies belbre a true L,uropean defence
aud securitr policr can be establishcd. a great
deal of progress in that direction canltot be ex-
pected for sorne tirnc to conrc.
1l
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32. However, the British initrative is perhaps
an oppoftunity not to be missed. Given that it
seerns to have attracted a measlrre of supporl
amor.lg European countries. fbr uhonr it repre-
sents an opportunitl' to nrake qualitatir'e prog-
ress towards the creation of a defence dirnen-
sion in a unified Europe. there are plentl' of rea-
sons also for regarding the present as a unique
opportunitt fbr pLrtting fonvard ideas offering a
conceptual response ttl the questions raised both
bl the British inrtiative and that taken b1, the
French and British at Saint Malo. It behol'es us
to take an equally constructile approach in con-
sidering uhat actiou can be taken by the WEU
Assemtrll.
IL'. Making the most of the opportunity to
ochieve quulitative progress in ternts of
Europeun securih' utrrl defenc'e
33. It has been said tinre and again that a ful-
lv iutegrated Europe can uevL-r be achic-l'ed
uhile securitl' and def-ence lrare no part in its.
Hollever. unless all the countries concerned are
agreed on the objectives. purpose and implica-
tions involved. it rvill remain a dead letter.
There is no escaping the fact that such agree-
ment does not )et exist but rarelr' have such
promising circunrstances presentecl themseh'es
as those that obtain todal'. This being so. it is
nevertheless uorth recallin-g a point the As-
senrbll ol- \\'EU has alreadv emphasised on
nran\ occasions. naurell'that an1'change in the
stctlLr.s 17lrr., should be designed to strengthen. not
ueaken. E,uropeau countries' security and E,ur-
ope's defence.
3-+. In this counection. the fact that the gov'-
ernrnents concerned mat f'eel dutl bound to de-
nronstrate progress to the public at large could
represent a danger. inasrnuch as haste and pres-
sllre rnay lead both to look to sirnplistic options
offering no real solution to the r-rnderll'ing
problerns. Indeed. one suclr that could lead to
developments capable of bcing presented as a
collective triurnph and progress fbr E,urope is to
elinrrnate \,\'Et.l 
- 
rvhosc contribution is poorll'
understood b1, the public at large in E,urope 
- 
in
far'our. in principle at least. of the European
s^' See tlre presentation of the Gerrnan Presidencl"s
progranune given bv Germany's Permanent Repre-
sentati'v'e to W'EU to the Permanent Council, l2 Jan-
uarl l 999.
Union. rvhich represents a far more successfll
embodiment of the aspirations of a large part of
that public. Such apparent institutional sirnpli-
fication is a likely scenario. lt should be re-
rnembered in this connection that the Assemblv
itself suppofted etforts to nrove graduallv in the
direction of a cor.r.rn.ron det-ence within the E,uro-
pean Uuion, thus making it possible for WEU
progressir ell' to integrate into the Uuion".
35. Houever tlre Assembly has alway,s ern-
phasised the need first to resolve the basic prob-
lerns that stand in the wa1, of a comuron
def-encc. or at anv rate seem to. But the rnain
difficulties are not institutional ones. The Rap-
portcur is persr-raded that institutional issues rvill
sort thernselves out once all the interested par-
ties are asreed on the prirne objective. Failing
such agreernent. an)' solution that ainred to
sirnplify uould be a retrograde step and uould
underrnine the European identitl .
36. We should ask ourselves then just horv
far u'e u,ant that identity to develop and in uhat
frameriork it should find expression. Clearl1,.
the organisation around lvhich a true European
identitl can fomr is thc Er.rropeau Union. and as
far as the freld ol the econonr) is concerned.
that identitl' alreadv largely exists. The intro-
duction of the sinsle curreucv. iI it proves suc-
cessfirl. rn other words if it gives rise to coutin-
rued econornic erpansion at tolerable social and
human cost to European society' as a u'ltole 
-
which cannot be taken as read 
- 
shoLrld produce
a con\'crgence of interests alnong the countries
involved to a point uhere it cannot help but
precipitate the delelopnrent of comrnon policies
irr a nuurber of areas and the reform ot' the
E,uropean institutions that is required flor thern
to be able to take on real political responsibili-
ties. as well as acting as a magnet drarrins Eur-
opean non-EU rnember states or those not in the
euro zone in closer around the Llnion. More-
over. the process should nrake it possible to
identifl rlore clearlv tlran in the past uhat
Europe's specific interests. as opposed to the
uider interests of the u,estern rvorld. in fact are.
Free trade can be tolerated by' European societr
only if it fbrrns parl of a rvider social aud politi-
cal fabric that gives it the right and the means to
run its oun afTairs democraticallv and to use its
12
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economic clout rrhere necessar)' to ensure its
viervs and interests prevail. just as the Anreri-
cans do on their account.
37 . What then should be the substance of the
E,uropean Securitv and Defence Identit)? Thc
follow ing are essential points the Assernbly
should press [or:
Europeans should decide rvhether thev
rvant Europe to inhabit a mono-polar
rvorld. u,ith the United States at its ful-
crum and under US rlanagernent. or
whether. reuroved frorn Llnited States
dourination. it is to becorne a player in
a multi-polar universe. Onll the sec-
ond option can give free rein to full
developrrent of the European identityl
the E,SDI urust encompass independ-
ent action by Europe in the lleld of
crisis maua-qernent. not merely Euro-
pean involvement in NATO-managed
operations:
the ESDI nrust nraintain the obligation
for Europeans to cor.ne to one an-
other's assistance. supplementing the
assistance clause contained in the
Washingtou Treaty. l-he Saint Malo
declaration is entirely' satistactory as
far as the fbregoing two points are
concerned I
the ESDI is being established u'ithin
the Atlantic Alliance. This raises dif'-
ficulties in terms of the inlolr'ement
of non-NATO states uhich are WEU
obserl'er countries. The objective of
ensuring Europe has its olvn iude-
pendent capability to take decisions
and to act and of bringing the cou-
struction of Europe to fruition through
gradual implernentation of the det-ence
project in the EU flraureu'ork is com-
plementary' to that process aud iu the
Ionger term European Union rnember
countries of norr-aligued tradition
should be included in it. Hence pro-
viding Europe u ith a capacity for
autonornous action alreadt, means that
development of the ESDI should not
be not confined solely' to the NATO
framervork. but must also go forward
in a specifically European context.
This is also an essential condition for
Europeaus bein,q able to takc r)n
greater responsibilities. in the iuterests
of the entire Euro-Atlantic cornnlLl-
nity, as the Nortlr Arnerican allies
have repeatedlt deuranded. Thus there
is no rlay of avoiding a ntinimunr
arnount of duplication as fhr as certairr
structures are concerned: horrever the
formula consistins of lbrces that are
"separable but not separate" which
applies to the CJTF uill prove verv
useful in restricting olerlap. Nevefihe-
less Europe nrust be guaranteed the
suppoft of credible military fbrces to
u'hich it can gain access rvithoLrt fear
of a l'eto frorn countries that have no
part. or none as yet. in the making of
Europe. The Saint Malo declaration
refers expressly to "uatioual or urulti-
national nreans oLrtside the NA-l'O
liarnervork".
the ESDI must also take full account
of the securitf irrterests of those cen-
tral E,uropean nations that rvill derive
no benef-it in tlre foreseeable tlture
frorn a tirrther opening up of the At-
lantic Alliance to the East and u,hiclr
are being rnade hostage to the diffi-
culties the- European Union rs experi-
encing in agreeing a date 1br the intake
of neu rnernber states,
the ESDI nrust be based on a budset
policy u,hich sets def-ence expenditure
levels conrr.nensurate u'ith E,urope's
intended role as an independertt play'er
on the world stage and at the same
tirne meets American demands for it
to take on greater responsibilities rn
the context of trausatlantic securitr':
the ESDI must be based on a corrlrnon
industrial policl as far as arrnaments
are concented.
38. As stated in paragraph 33. the main aim
of any initiative to reorganise def'ence Europe
rnust be greater securitr,'. This reqLrrres careful
thoLrght before calling into question progress
made and the achievernents made to date in tlre
Europeau Union. NATO and WEU fraureuorks.
TIre Maastricht and Arnsterdam Treaties set up
a rv'hole system of cooperation and coordination
13
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betrveen the European LJuion and S/Etl rvhiclr is
oulv nou corning on strearn. \!'hat are the chan-
ces of replacing that *ith arranee-nrents enab-
lins the European Llnion to act under its oun
steanr ?
i9. As a resLrlt ol the decisions taken in Ber-
lin. NATO becanre the initiator ol a series of
arrangements firr allou ing European peace-
keeping opcrations to be rnrplenrented under
\\/EU's political control and drrection. Arrange-
ments covcnng the CJTIT. con.rnrand stnlctrlres.
defence planning aud erercises ou the transfer
and return of NATO assets are iu the process of
being finalised. Can sLrch arrangements be
transposed into agrcerrrcnts that *ould create a
direct lirrk benreen the European LInion and
NA fO')
+0. \\'EU. uhich has substantialll' developed
its uun capabilrtr'. ls no\\ firllv opcrational.
Irufthenlore it olf crs the fblloriing adrantages
in that:
it has rnilitarl' capabilities enabling it
to Lrnclcrtake the gaurut of "Petersberg
nr issions" fiom hunranrtanarl aid or
crisis-prcr ention throuqh peace en-
tbrcenrent to corrbat:
the te-r.r full mcnrbers and si_unatorie's
of'the nrodifled [Jrusscls Treatr. bcing
nrcnrbers of both the European Union
and NATO. are ablc to take dccisions
as Europe's def-ence "harcl core":
it also rnakes it possible fbr the 28
countries of r,arling status that coll-
prise the \\'l:LI farrril)' to takc parl in
consultations on basic problerns of
Etrropearr sccr.lrlt\ :
it can interrcne on behalf of the ELr:
it can drau on NATO assets:
it can operate "ollt of area":
rt coordinates arrnartrents polict' and is
alonc ln E,Lrrope in discharging that
rtr le .
it hrings central ancl eastcrn Europcan
countries into a E,uropcan def'ence rn-
strtution:
it allou s European countrics ri ith a
non-alignecl traclitirln to drau closer to
NATO:
it enables IlLrrc'rpean countries that are
rurernbers ol NATO but not of the EU
to drau closer to the Union.
it is sLrbject to dernocratic scrutirrv
through its Asseurbly. acting in con-
junction uith the natic'rnzrl parliaments
of the l8 countries represcnted:
its operational capabilitl has seer.r
rrra.jor irrr estnrent irr rcccnt \ ears:
it has one foot in the ELI and the other
in NATO thus acting as a bridge be-
t\\eelr u,hat have hitherlo been entire Iv
scparatc orgatt isat iorts:
it has close relatic'rns rr ith Russia and
Ukraine.
+ I . All the above represents achier,'eurents of
considerable irnportance that rnust he nrain-
tained and develope'd. irrespective ol the insti-
tutional fortnula er,entuallr arrir cd at. If it
proves possible to keep those achiercnrents in-
tact. there uould be nothing standing in the rrar
ot' progress touards thc creation ol a true de-
f-ence dimension to the European Union.
12. If that rrcre to conre about. the implica-
tions at the institutional lcvel and the adjust-
ments needccl to the treatics uoLrld irnrnediatelr
be obvioLrs. Ilouerer it raiscs the question ol-
uhether all European nations are no\\, reacll' ttr
sign Lrp to the European cletcnce project as de-
scribecl in the foregoing parauraphs aud trr uir,'e
it their suppoft.
-li. 'l'his is flrst and lbrernost a questir)n that
should be addressed to the United Kingdonr. Is
Britain prepared to agreL- to and throu, its tvc-ight
hehind a true con.lnron def'ence in the [iuropean
IInion franreuork. in other uords outside the
Atlantic Alliance? The Saint Nlalo cleclaration
off-ers no ans\\er as it only refcrs to a capacitv
fbr autonor.r.ror-rs action. The British clo not u,ant
there to be a lruropcan an]rv and have left no
roonr for doLrbt as to the primc inrportauce thel'
attach to NATO as the main European sectrritr
organisation. 'l'here is therefbre a 
_sreat deal of
underlving unceftaintv as to thc specific areas
uhere tlre British have in fact had a chauge of
hear1.
-+-1. The nert questlon is one fbr the fll'e
WELJ obserrer nations. Are thel riilling ttt be
bound. u'itltin the E,uropean Union. b1 a nrutual
l-+
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assistance clause. rihich woLtld turn the Union
into a military' alliance? For most of thern the
ans\\'er rs no. How'ever. it slrould be uoted that
their indiridLral positions'vary on a ntulber of
points. The countrl' which has shorrn the great-
est scepticisnr about a filture mtttttal assistance
clause is Srveden. TIte nerv Foreign Affairs
Minister seerns to leave no doubt about her gov-
enrment's attitLrde. The Swedish Governlnent
rnakes a clear distinction betrreen crisis man-
agement and territorial defertce. Su edett is
ready to take part in crisis-ntattagement and
other operations ref-erred to in the Amsterdarr
Treatr'. bLrt has alfirrned that "the borderline of
our intenrational cooperation is drau'n at col-
lectrve security arrangcments"ru.
45. The reasons rvhich lie behind this position
are essentialll'tuofold. tlrst. there is insuffi-
cient corrsensus arnong the political parties. es-
pecralll those that support the Social Demo-
cratic Covernment: secondll'. public opinion is
still deepll'resistant to drastic change in the
countr\''s foreign and security policl .
46. Finland. rihich rlill hold the next EU
Presidencl. does ttot. despite officiallf identit-r-
ing itself rvith the Srvedish position on a pos-
sible mutual assistance clause. seem to rule out
the possibility' for the flture. The Prirne Minster
has on several occasions emphasised the irnpor-
tance of NATO (and WEU) ntembcrship as an
option. In other uords. the Finnish approach is
qLrite flexible. mainly due to generally lrigh
lelels of public support and substantial political
consensus ou governrnent security policl . Hori-
er,'er. the countr) has alwals had to be InindfLrl
of its relationship uith Russia. rrhich is based
on a bilateral treat,r' replacing the forttrer treatv
rvith the Sor iet Union.
,11 
. Arnong the countries of ueutral persua-
sion. Austria has shou'n the ntost genuine inter-
est in a nrutual assistance clause. 81' cotttrast
rvith the political scene iu Scaudinal'ian coun-
tries. sorne Austrian political parties seem to
accept the idea of giving up their neutrality' in
the near future. Others. like the Social Demo-
cratic Partl'. seem lrore resistant to radical
change in the short to nredium tenn. Hou'ever,
'' Addr.rt by' the Suedish Foreign Minister. Anna
Lindh. to the Institute for Foreign Policy rn Stock-
holm. l6 Decenrber 1998
the idea of a mutual assistance clause in the
longer tenl seelns to find general acceptance.
18. Ireland is at presertt the countrv w'lrose
position is least well-defined. It is not in a posi-
tion to sign a nrutual assistance clause as its in-
ternal security policl' debate has 
-iLrst taken on a
new lease of lif-e and Partnership fbr Peace (PfP)
is the key' issue. Given that other erstuhile neu-
tral nations held this debate several lears before
signing Lrp lor PfP. it seetns unlikell that the
question of a mutual assistance clause u ill enter
into the discussiou in the short to nrcdium term.
-+9. Finally'. the concenls of Delrrnark, a
NATO mernber courttry' and another reticent.
though {renerally sLrpportil'e, EU metttber. are to
be distinguished fiom the other. traditionally
neutral. uations. Dc-nnrark's openll' expressed
reservations about a trrutual assistance clattse
mal also reflect the tacit concerns ol other
countrics about collective cornmitments. More-
over. there is r.ro guarautee that opposition rrtal
not also be encountered from WEU menrber
countries. I lertce Gertnan Clrancellor Schroder's
recent staternent betore the Bundestag to thc
effect that no one u'as thinking of arming the
ELrropean Union irt order to turrt it iltto a rtrili-
tarr' pouerll.
V. Murgins witltitr w,hiclr inslilutionol
proposuls cun muke ground
50. Unofficial sources suggest that certailt
governr.nents take tlte v'ierv that if the European
CoLrncil decides in fhvoLrr of establishing a conr-
rnon defence in the European Urtiolt. and otr
WELI's integration. this could be irnplernented
uithout an intergorenrnrental cortferencc or
ratification b1' parliaments. Coverntnetrts col.t-
cerned will therefore ueed to be reminded that a
decisron of this nature necessarill, irnplies rer i-
sion of the Treaties and. consequentll. ratiflca-
tion by parliautents.
5I . If oue proceeds ott tlte assumption that it
uill not be possible for the Fifteen to agree orl
the E,uropean Union's being transfornred into a
rnilitary alliance in the foreseeable future. the
issue then becornes one of hou at least to facili-
tate and simplify the Europeau decision-tnaking
process. At present this takes placc in both
l5
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WEU and the E,uropean Uuion's CFSP. Resr"rlts
in WEU hale been meagre. through lack of
sLrfflcient unanimrty of rieus antong lts mem-
bers. This is an obstacle that no institutional or
decision-making nrachinery cau surrroLlut uu-
less European societv is contpletelv trans-
fbrrned. The CFSP. althou_gh located within the
European LInion. has achievcd no better results
than WEU and transferring WEU's actir,,ities to
the EU r"'ould not gire Europe the decision-
making capabilitl,it lacks at preseut. C'on-
l'erselr. it ntight be helpfLrl fiom norv on if the
t\\o proccsses \\ere reduced to a sinele one bl,
transf-errin-u the exercise of the WEU Council's
decision-rnaking po\\ ers to the European
Council or the Council of Ministers of the
European Uuion. which rvould meet in the pres-
ent \\'EU confisuration. in other u,ords trith
defence rninisters present and associate rnem-
ber. observer and asst'rciate paftner country rep-
resentation. in Iine uith those countries' r,arvins
statuses.
51. Such sinrpliflcation of the decision-rnak-
ins process rrould avoid a contplicated s)'stem
fbr taking a succession of decisions having to be
uorked out and irnplemented b1 WEU and the
E,uropeau Union. The blLreprint for that s)'stem 
-
a flou-clrart drau,lt up in I997 
- 
enlisaged ncr
f'euer than -13 separate steps lbr rnounting \\'E,tJ
action at the request of the European Uniorr.
The nunrber of steps in the process has in the




l. Optiotts currenll.l, under considerotion
53. ln order to facilitate preparation of deci-
srons and action to bc taken bv Europe. the fol-
louing options are currentlt being exarnined:
transfer of 'W'EU's political responsi-
bilities to the European Union and its
military firnctions to NATO;
transt-er of WEU's political and mili-
tan'functions. apart fiom those arisirrg
fiorn rnutual assistance contmitrnents
in a collective det'ence framework
(Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty), to the E,uropean Union,
'' S.. Pe-ter Schmrdt's analvsrs entitled "Neu-
orientierung in der Sicherheitspolitik?" 
. Stftung ll'rs-
sensc'huft und Politik. January'1999. page 1.1.
integration of WEU into the CFSP
(European Union second pillar):
transfbrmation of S'EU into an "Ag-
ency" olthe E,uropean Union:
integration of WEU into a fourth Eur-
opean Union pillan
a stronser. revitalised WEU.
5-+. The flrst option is the one that the British
initially' seerned to prefer. This u'ould lead to
WELI's dcnrise. Although thc Saint Malo dec-
laration does not sav as rnuch, the idea is still on
the tablc-. TIris model is one that could find
favour with North American allies and possibly
also uith countries of non-aligned tradition. al-
thoLrgh it would impl1, tinding a solution to the
problerns of neutral country involvement in
NATO rnilitarv cooperatiou and of associate
menrber and associate partner int,olvement in
political cooperation in the EU framervork.
Houer'er the rnain drawback to this option is
that it lreans det-erring any' European det-ence
project indefinitely. lt is therefbre one that can-
ruot be entertaincd. unless that pro.ject is to be
abandoned for good.
55. It seeurs far more likely. hotrever. that
governnrents u,ill look to the second option for a
solution. entrustins both WEU's political re-
sponsibilities and its militarv, crisis-manaqe-
ment activitr. in trhich the neutral countries are
able to take part. to the lruropean Union. ]'his
uould nrean briusing WEU armaments coop-
eration rvithin the cornrnunity sphere and incor-
porating WEU's rnilitarv responsibilitics inro
the CFSP 
- 
apaft frorn those perlainine to col-
lective defence. as envisaged under Article V.
u,lrich rvould remain "in abey'auce". as it were.
oLrtside the European Union. If this option rvere
to conre about. W'EU uould be drained of all
substance and Defence Europe uould be seri-
ously compromised. It ntust be borne in nrind
that the ternptation fbr governrnents to follow
this course is the greater. since it is quite pos-
sible to inrplernent this option rvithout amend-
ing the existing treaties. It is clear. therefore.
that the Assenrblv must speak out t-irrnlv against
anr, such disrnantling of WEU. uhich. under the
present circurnstances, rvould rob it of all
cred ibilitr .
56. It is admittedly. houever. \'erv hard to
arguc against this option, given that it leaves
16
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Article V of the modified Brussels Treatf intact.
on paper at least, by' holding it in abey'ance out-
side the E,uropean Union. Supporters of this
option ma1'rvell argue that it changes little in a
situation that has obtained since Europeans took
the decision to assign full responsibility' for
implementation of Article V collective defence
obligations to the relevant NATO authorities.
They could also clairn that this solution woLrld
allolv Europeans to give substance to the Euro-
peau defeuce project rvhc-n the political situation
allowed or denranded it. However in point of
fact. there is a firndantental difference between
the present position and the one that rvould en-
sue lrorn tlre option in qrrestion.
51. Currently' collective def'ence. although
confiued to the ten full mernbers of \l'EU. is a
political reality' because it is based on an insti-
tution. WEU. rvhich urorritors the application of
the relevant clause of the Treaty'. Notuithstand-
ing the fact that. in 1950. Europeans decided to
assign the militarf irnplementation of a collec-
tive def-ence founded on Article V of the nrodi-
fied Brussels Treatl'to NATO. the decision was
still based ou the assurnption of the continuinq
presence on the continent of E,urope of a cred-
ible number ol adequately arrred Anrerican
troops,
58. That presence. backcd up by the US nu-
clear umbrella. uas guaranteed throughout the
entire cold uar period. but question marks are
norv beiug raised over it by' a grouiug number
of American politicians. ouins to the profbund
changes vurought in the iuternational securit-y
euvironrnent since the fall of the Berlin rvall.
E,ven thor,rgh, in the present climate. the possi-
biliti, of an armed attack on the territorial in-
tegrity of WEU member states seenrs wholll
rernote, it rvould be extremell'dangerous to con-
clude in consequence that the European collec-
tive defence commitment is no longcr uecessar)
and can be discharged solely' by' reference to
Article 5 of the Washinqton Treaty'. Hou'erer. if
all WEU's political and nrilitary responsibil-
ities, apart from its Arlicle V responsibilities.
lr'ere transferred to the European Union. Article
V uor-rld become del'oid of political substance.
despite the Treatl''s remaining in fbrce, owing
to the fhct that WEU. as the organisation hith-
erto responsible for its application. had been
transf'crred lock. stock aud barrel to the Er.rro-
pean Union. It would be politicallv unrealistic
to think that a Treatv that w'as no longer applied
could be reactivated to order.
59. It is necessary. therefbre. to press honre
the need to lay doun a legal basis uou fbr the
trausfer of Europe's collective def-ence com-
mitrnent to the European Union. This could be
done bf incorporating all WEU's responsibili-
ties into the CFSP. rvhich u'ould lend substance
to the third option.
60. A solution such as this is fully acceptable
to the Assembll'. It is clear. however. that it
raises a rrajor problenr for the European Union,
principally, for tu o reasons:
(i) firstl1. neither the neutral countries
nor certain other ELrropean Unior.r coun-
trics at present \\ant to accept the incor-
poration of a rnutual assistance clause in-
to the Treaty' ou European Union. More-
over, such a clause urust of necessitv be
incorporated into the bodl' of the 1'reaty'
itself and not relegated to a separate.
ancillary protocol rvhich individual nrern-
ber states would be fiee to sign or not
("opting out"). SLrch au oLltrageous con-
cession. simply, to accorrrnodate the inte-
rests of the neutral courrtries. rvould cor.n-
pronrise the ven essence of the cornrnon
E,uropean def-ence project and erode rnem-
ber stal.es' securit\.
(i11 European Union nrember countries
are probabl\ not ln agreenrent that the
EU's comrrunitv pillar and the CFSP
should be separated frorn one another so
as to allorl WEU associate members and
partners to take parl in CFSP activities. in
the w'ay they are currentll' able in WELI.
This is. horvever. a non-negotiable condi-
tion of WEU's transf-er to the CFSP if
every'thing those countries have gained in
WEU is to be preserved.
6l . It is politically unacceptablc to scale
down the riuhts acquired by WEU asst'rciate
countries b1' substitLrting flor their respective cat-
egories of status a varietl' of bilateral arrange-
ments tailored to their current individual posi-
tions vis a vis the E,uropean Union. Proposals.
for example. tltat Tr"rrkel should only'have spe-
cial ties uith the CFSP area. along the lines of
the NA-|O-Russia Joint Councilri or NATO's
1l
''t As Pete, Schmidt su-q-!:ests: op ctt.. page l7
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arrangeurents uith Ukraine. should not be enter-
tained.
62. For the Lstiluto -lffurr httanru:iotruli,
WEU's transformation into alr ascnc-\' of tlre
European Union. as suqgested b1 the Frenclt
President. rvould irnpll its transfer to the second
pillar of thc- European Union 'rrhile retainirrs its
ou'n characteristic shape and specific naturerr.
The Institute e\pressed a prefereuce for th is
(fbur-th) option. rihich, in its vieu. would make
it possible. at least in the longer term, for WEU.
aloug uith the CFSP, to be drawn into a corn-
rnunitl fianrework. Horvever the Institute is
silent on the subject of horv W'EU can be trans-
ferred to the CFSP rihile retaining its independ-
ence.
63. Such an airn u'ould be easier to achiere if
WEU *'ere to becorne a fburth pillar within the
European Union. as proposed in the fifth option.
That is also a solution the Assenrblr could ac-
cept. It rvould have the advarttage ol secttring
full participation for associate countries and
preser!ing Europe's commitment to collective
defence rvithout countries uith a non-aligncd
tradition being obliged to join. Furthernrorc the
necessar) decisions could be taken u ithin the
institutional fiameuork of the Europearr Union.
'fhis nrodel uould also facilitate the transition
fronr rrorking relations betueen WEU and
NATO to drrcct ties betrveen NATO aud the
E,uropean Union. Horvever it could only be a
ternporar)' solution since it r"ould imply' differ-
ent configurations within the various pillars of
the European Union, and simplr shift the prob-
lenr of WEU/C'FSP relations to the latter's rela-
tionship rl'ith the loLrrth pillar. Coheren* uithin
the European Union could thercfore be com-
promised and it is not clear that the E,uropean
Union uould be prepared to entertain an optiort
uhich did not fundanrentallv changc the exist-
ing situation.
6-1. Lastll. at the infomral nreetiug of the
European Union defence ministers. held in
Vienna in Norember 1998. the British Defence
Minister. Mr Robertson. did not nrle out a sixth
option 
- 
namely. strengthening and revitalising
L See "Proposals for the gradual
Western European LInion into the
Rome. l6 Novenrber 1998.
integration of the
European Union".
WEU. No details u'erc given of wltat this might
basically consist.
65. In the context of its contribrrtion to the
preparatory' rvork for the last Intergoverunreutal
Couference. the Assembh drew up proposals
fbr:
WEU being able to act on the Euro-
pean Union's behalf: or
its at least being giren a penraneut
nrandate to frame. er o.fficio. Union
decisions and actions u,ith defence irn-
plications and to inrplement them.
The EU rnerlber qovcrnrnents in the event
chose to fbllou'the course set b1'the Maastricht
and Amsterdam 'l'reaties uhich concentrate de-
cision-nraking po\\er on the E,uropean CoLrncil.
uithout uaiting until such time as the EU could
take on the u'hole range of responsibilities in
connection with European securitv and defence.
rihich rules out the first proposal. Houever. this
does not preveut WEU being giren a pcrmanent
rnandate. under the terms of uhich it u'oLrld be
rcsponsible for the preparation e.r officio of EU
decisions and actions. using the range ol in-
struunents available to it under the rnodifled
Brussels Treatl . Such an approach uoLrld rtot
inrolve an1 anrcndrxerlt to the existing Treatic's
and rrould rnake it possible subsequently' for all
of WEU's responsibilities gradually to be inte-
grated into thc E,uropean Union.
2. The future of the ntodifiel Brussels Treafi'
66. Apart frorl tlre first option, all the other
alternatives discussed above uould saf-eguard
the nrodified Brussels Treaty' in rrhole or in
part: it rvould then corne Lrnder the aegis of the
European Union. A firrlher possibility rrould be
to draft neu' legal fbr"rndations fbr developirrg a
European defence policr outside the nrodified
Brussels Treatl'- as the Fifteen had begurr to do
in the Maastricht and Aursterdarn -f reatl
franreuorks and reorganise structures accord-
ingly'. It is common knori ledge. hou'ever. that
having tailed to reach agreerrent ou a common
det-ence. enconrpassing eler) dimension pos-
sible. being established within the European
Urrion. the lritteen uere forced to call a halt
midual .
67 . Llnder such circunrstances, the Assembll'
should therefbre corne out in favour of an ap-
18
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proach that recosnises the present and possible
future serriceabilitl, of the rnodified Brussels
Treatl'. the cornerstones of *hich arc Article V.
whercbr the High Contractirrg Parties pledge to
afford one another urutual assistance rvith all
nreans at their disposal if one of them should be
the object of an arrned attack in Europe. and
Ar-ticle Vlll rrhich creates an orgarrisatiorr.
WEU. ri ith the task of ensuring the Treaty is
implemented and consultation takes place in the
event of a threat to international peace. and of
setting up an)' subsidiarl' bodies required for
carrl,ing out its task. Lastl1,. Arricle lX subor-
dinates the Council's actil'ities to the scrutiny of
a parliaurentart Assernbll' cornposed of delega-
tions from the parliaments of member couutries
to the Parliamentar\ Assembly of the CoLrncil of
Europe.
68. Houever. these essential provisions can-
ruot be dissociated fronr other aspects of thc
Treatr'. includrng thosc ret'crring to relatious
ri'ith thc Unitcd Nations (Afticle VI) and NATO
(Article IV). all of uhich rer.nain fully rclevant
in thc ncw intcrnational clrmate. The ottlr,' sec-
tions of the Treatr, that are norv obsolele are
Protocols Il. Ill and IV rvhich. although part of
tlre Treatl'. govenmrents have decided by' corn-
mon accord no longer to app11. given that they'
deal *ith obligations conceming forces and ar-
maurents production and control rvhich are no
longer relevant to the realities of present-day'
E,urope. Up to nou. the \\IEU Council. in other
uords the sisnator\ states as a body, has taken
the vieu that the Treatv rneets E,urope's needs
and does not require aul, re\ision and that Art-
icle V could not be challenged. There is nothing
to suggest these r ieu s har,'e changed. even if the
likelihood of recourse to Article V has becomc
nrorc rer.r.rote. In this connection that parl of the
Reph of the Council to Recomnrendation 639
in which the Council recalls that at their'
nreetiug in Rhodes "the Ministers noted that
although circurnstances had dramatically clrang-
ed since the signature of the modif-ied Brussels
Treaty'. this still continued to fbrrn a r,aluable
part of the European security architecture" is
erpressll to be uelcomed. To separate deploy-
ment of WEU's assets, or its operations in con-
nection r.rith securitl' in Europe. from the obli-
gation to provide mutual assistance ri,ould be to
destroy' the basrc jLrstification for a European
cornrron policl' and turn \\'ELi into an ap-
pendage of NA-|O or thc- Unrted Nations.
69. Ii WEU *ere incorporated into thc E,uro-
pean [Jnron. the fhct of keeping the Treatv
uould suggest that \\IELI shor-rld contiuue to be
separate from other EU bodies. so long as sonre
E,uropean LInion rnernber countries are not pre-
pared to accept its pror isions. Such a distinction
remains possible if the alternative of creating a
fourth ELrropean Union pillar is the one chosen.
or possibly that involving WEU's trans-
formation into a European Uuion Agency'.
3. ll'EL' ns on Orgortisoliott
10. \['EU is rnade up of the Council. bringing
together fbreign and defence ministers of the
nreurber states or their representatives. the sLrb-
sidiarl'bodies of the Council and the Assenrblv.
All of their origins and responsibilities derive
directly' or indirectlv frorn the -freat1, and to-
gether the I fbrrn an organ isation sLr itcd tir
Europe's present situation. It is possible to en-
visage incorporating that uhcrlc into thc E,urrr-
pean Union bLrt it uould be fbolhardv to r,rn-
dermine one or other of, its cornponcnt parls
u,ithout taking account of the overall cohesiorr
of the Organisation 
- 
sonrething u,hich cerlainly
did not happen uhen the exercise of other WEU
responsibilities uas transferred to NATO. the
Council of Europe or to the E,uropean Com-
munitl'.
71. As stated earlier. there is nothing to pre-
vent tlte lI'ELI ('ourrcll being assirnilated into
the Er-rropean Council sub.iect to ceftain condi-
tions. nar.nelv
L defence nrinisters and their represen-
tatives should continuc to attend the
rrcctir.rgs. sincc thcv are thc channel fbr
nrerrber state involvernent in a nunrber of
subsidiary' bodres of the Council and that
of the nationa I amrcd fbrces in WELJ op-
erations:
L European CoLrncil meetinss dealing
u'ith foreigu polic1,. securitl' and defence
issues should be open to S/EU associate
rnernber and associate partr)er countries:
3. \!'EU Council decision-making pro-
cednres. in other uords the principle of
conseusus 
- 
essential in an area in 'rvhich
l9
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all urember states retain their prerogatives
in hrll 
- 
rrust continue to apply;
-1. the Council rnust continue to be ser-
red by' a secretariat that meets its par-
ticLrlar ueeds. The Secretariat-General
rras not created under the Treaty'and cau
be adapted to the changin-e needs ol the
Organisatron, but it must meet certairr
standards. in particular as regards secLr-
rit1. This uould not prevent its staff un-
dertaking duties tbr the European Union
as uell as WEU. for instance the Euro-
pean Council Secretarv-General and
CFSP High Representative misht double
tup as Secretan-General of WEU. regard-
less of u'hether WEU is incorporated into
the Union or uot.
ln point of fact. the German Presidenc,r'.
through the intermediarl' of its Foreisn
Aftairs Miuister. and then of the Federal
Chancellor. recentlv subrnittcd a proposal
to tlris elfbct to its partners, rvhile the
German Defence lVlinister. Mr Scharping.
although he supported it. pointed out that
before nroving forrvard in this area. one
n.rust not forget to bring the Europearr
Union and WEU riithin the domain of the
CFSPr5. It is true that irnplenrentiug such
a proposal is likell to be unproductir,'e if
it remains simpll' one isolated action. for
if it is not accompanied by additional
measures designed to bring about greater
convergence betueen the tu,o organisa-
tions. the person chosen to carry out this
dual maudate will be faced rvith persis-
tent conllicts of interests for as long as
['EU and tlre European Union have dif-
f-ereut firnctions and contigurations.
72. 'ilrc sub.suliury bodic.s each differ rvidell'
in krnd. Some. such as the Institute flor Securitv
Studies. or the Satellite Centre. consist solell' of
nrembers of staff of the Organisation. others are
made up of national delesations sLrpported by an
international secretariat and as such are ans\!er-
able to international oreanisations only' in ad-
rninistrative terms. Such is the case of the Mili-
tar1, Staff and. b1, ertension. its subordinate
bodies. and also of WEAG and WEAO. The
Council and the bodies of the Council are an
indirisible whole. as they are mutuall), com-
plementarl in providin_q WEU rvith nrilitary,
capabrlity and therr existence is based on the
application of Article VIII of the Treatv. It
should be borne in urind that Denmark, Norwar'
and '['urkel are mernbers of WE,U's Militarl,
Statf and of WEAG.
73. Corrrerselr'. the 11 hlu.y'1955 Agreentent
uould lapse if WEU rvere to lose its independ-
ent legal status and there is a need to consider
carefulh. in the case of the WEU bodies. to
what extent Europeau Union law could apply':
an in-depth studl'uould need to be conducted.
It is likell that the status of staff, parliamentar)'
delegations and parliamentarians u,ould be
consrderabll improved therebl' but it is not cer-
tain that goven.lments uould readily' agree to
extending the obligations and eutitlements of
Europc-an Union staff to nrilitarl' personnel.
This rvould be a rnatter necding to be looked
into in due course but it is one of some intpor-
tauce since. bearing iu rnind WEU's enlarge-
nrent. the nratter of extending European Union
lau to nor.r-r.nernber countries uould then arisc.
as it lras already' arisen in WEU.
4. The associale countries
11. Since 1991. WEU has been involved in a
mzrssive undertaking rvhose airn is to create a
vast area of peace and security' in E,urope and to
prepare frrr accession to $'estern structures E,ur-
opean countries uhich, for various reasous.
\\ere uot hitherto included in thern. The Euro-
pean Union and NATO are also paft of that un-
dertaking but each organisation coutributes ac-
cording to its ouu resources and criteria. rihich
inrplies tinrescales that are Iikely,to be extensive
before institLrtional and geographic E,urope co-
inc rde.
15. As fhr as S/EU \\,as conccrned. the sor,-
ernnrelrts took the l'ieu that onll countries that
uere alreadv rnernbers of both NATO and the
European Union slrould be allou,ed to accede to
the modified Brussels Treaty'. so that there uas
ruo hindrance to cooperation between NATO
and WEU. and to avoid anl delav to the latter's
possible incorporation into the European Uniou.
Houever. thev decided to create three catego-
ries of associate rlernbership so that all coun-
tries could become inl'olved immediatelv in
those of WEU's activities rvhere this u,as pos-
't See intervieu uith Le Ftgttro.l8 February, 1999.
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sible without calling into question the two
overriding objectives. Those categories of status
are in practice erolr,ing constantll,towards ever
greater participation in WEU's activities. The
Council 
",irtually nou onlv sits at l8 (soon to
rise to 2l). that is in the presence of the NATO
or EU nrernbers. or at 28. in other rvords r,vith a
further l0 central and eastern European coun-
tries (soon to thll to 7) in attendance. Among
the reasons one can identif_r for the change are a
*'ish on the parl of rnost of those countries to
join the \\'estenr s1 stem as soon as possible.
WEU's need to call on some of them to con-
tribute to operations directed torvards peace-
keeping in Europe and a chanse of direction in
WEU in favour of a European securitl' policy.
uhile its defence role continues to decline.
76. The Lrpshot is that those countries are norv
da fut'to Inenrbers of \\/ELI. T'he publicly and
repeatedll stated declarations the Ten have
rnade regarding their inr,olvement even gir,'es
thern r/c 7ra'c nrenrbership. notrv'itltstanding the
fhct that thev hare uot signed the Treaty, do not
operate under the internal legal reuirne of the
Organisation or suppll' perrnanent staff to it.
The Assembll' has just asked the Council16 to
take steps to correct the second form of dis-
crimination so that their entitlernents are com-
rrensurate riith the contribution they actually
make to S EU's acti\ ities.
17. Clearlr. \\'EU's possible incorporation in
the European Union should not r.nean that those
countries. eveu if thel are not EU meurbers,
lose an1' of the advantages they' have gainedl
rather it should enable thern to consolidate the
terrns of their inr,olrement in WEU's activities.
Any restrictron placed on that involvement
rl'ould convev a negatil'e rncssagc to the coun-
tries concerned and call the prosress rnade by'
E,uropc as a \\hole towards establishing a col-
lcctir c sectrritr s\ sten) into question.
18. Cour erselr'. constraints of an essentially
econornic kind are doLrbtless lrkell' to contiuue
to prelent accession by'all the associate parlner
countries. some of thenr shoftly to become as-
sociate members. to the European Union's
'6 See Recommendation 639 on "The political and
legal consequences of WEU's enlargement to take in
non-signatorl' countries of the modified Brussels
Treaty 
- 
reply to the annual reporr of the Council".
conrnrunitl' pillar. TLrrke\'s case is cornplicated
by other political drtflculties making European
Linion entn' unlikely for the foreseeable firture.
This meaus that \\'EU's incorporation iuto the
E,uropean Union should enable those couutries
to continue to plal their full part in WEU ac-
tivities and. to the extent that those activities
should increasingll be rlore closell' tied in rvith
the CFSP. they' should be included in that also,
even if. fbr the time being. thev cannot be part
of the CFSP decision-rnaking machinerl'. Hence
WEU would not onlr need lvide autonoml'
within the EU but reform uithin the European
Union rvould also be necessar)' to distance the
CFSP fufther from the cornmunity pillar.
19. Houeler. as previously stated. it is ex-
trernely, doubtful u,hether the European Uniou
uould approve a developntent likely to accen-
tuate even hrfther the distinction betn'een the
cor.nrnunitt and intergor,ernrnental pillars. par-
ticularlv if policres 
- 
supporled bl Gernranl'and
Italy in particular gradually' to bring the CFSP
u,ithin the cornrnunitv sphere continue to hold
su'ar'. This all goes to show the difflcLrlties that
have to be resolred in order to avoid WEU's
iucorporatiou in the E,uropean Union leading to
a rveakening of the rights of WE,U associate
members or partners.
80. It is highli' unlikeh that the Atlantic Alli-
ance \\ill rnake anr, specific statement at the
Washinston Summit as to fufther eulargement.
Moreover. there is verv little likelihood of
reaching an agreenrent to identifl bv nanre one
or rnore countries uhich might join the Alliance
rvith the ne\t \\ave of entrants. The coLrntries
concenred 
- 
thc' seven central E,uropean cour.t-
tries u'hiclr are assoclate partners in WELI 
- 
also
present difficulties for the E,uropean Union.
u'hose rnenrber states disagree about ri,hen EU
cnlarsenrent to the east nright conrreuce and to
r.r hich countries it should appl),. It should be
note'd in this connection that France. Belgiunr
and Italy'. on signing the Anrsterdarn Treaty'.
appended a declaratiou ou the need to reforrr.r
the European institutions prior to an-v enlarge-
ment.
81. Under such circumstauces. WEU alone is
able to offer central European associate paftners
their only' concrete opportunitl,to be part of the
framin,g of a E,uropean security,policy and. more
irnporlantll'. of being included in a E,uropean
2t
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securit)' area. not\!ithstanding the lact that thel'
are uot covered by the collective defence guar-
antee. If WEU's joining one of the European
Uniou pillars meaut the loss of that particular
benefit fbr the countries concerned. it rvere bet-
ter that \!'E,Ll rernained. in the first instance at
least. an indeperrderrt orsartisation.
82. The WEU Assembly should also be on its
guard so as to ensure that participation by the
parliamentarl' delegations of non-signator)
states to the modified Brussels Treatl in Euro-
pean securitl, debates is not threatened b1'
WEU's incorporation in the Union. This can be
guaranteed onll' b1 the continued e.ristence of
the Assenrbly'and its retaining its present
po\\'ers. which. pursuant to the modified Brus-
sels Treatl . encompass CFSP activities. not-
uithstanding the thct that the latter also fall
rvithin the purvieu' of the European Parliament.
It would appear that the Assembly's protests
about the refirsal of senior EU ofllcials to conre
and address it hare already struck hotne to an
e\tent. Pressure r.nust continLre to be applied in
this connection.
5. The fulure of denrucralic scruliny
83. Transfer of WEU's acti,uities to the Euro-
pean Union could be rnade at the Assembly''s
expense. if a decision \\'ere taken by the trvo
Councils (EU and WEU) that the exercise of its
responsibilities should be discharged by the
European Parliament. Tlris uould hal'e the ap-
pearance of progress torlards a unitary orgarri-
sation of Europeau parlianrentary'tif'e. A sirnilar
devolution of porvers involving the Council and
its subsidiarl bodies is likell to prove a I.t.tucl.t
rnore drfflcult task.
8-1. 'fhe Assembh,'s responsibilities are
gror:nded in Article IX of the Treaty' rvhich de-
flnes it as being composed of representatives of
the rnodif-ied BrLrssels Treatl, signatory states to
the Parliamentar) Assenrbll' of the CoLrncil of
Europe. It is not possible therefore to divest it of
those responsibilities u ithout amending the
Treaty'. in other rvords rvithout opening the
floodgates to requests from many countries,
signatories or othenvise of the present Treaty.
for a much more far-reaching revierv. However
the Assembly is aware that it sLrfTers fionr two
disadl'antages as a resr"rlt of Article IX:
it is too tightll, bound to the CoLrncil
of Europe and its nrernbers are over-
burdened lvith the responsibilities irr-
roll'ed in belonging to tlvo active in-
ternational assemblies. in addition to
those sterlming fiorn tlteir work irt
their orru national parliaments:
it cannot. as it rvor"rld w'ish. contrive to
have a suitable status instituted for
delegations of non signatory states.
Hou'eler the consequences of any atternpt it
nright make to rectifl those problems rvould be
to undennine its oun basis in law. in other
u'ords to dirninish its authority and hasteu a
possible move to trausfer its activities. nrinus its
responsibilities. on the basis of "partial agree-
ments" betueen the tuo Councils.
85. Manl at preseut subscribe to a trend to-
uerrds opening the Assemblv's doors as rvide as
possible to the delegations of countries tltat
hal'e not siened thc Treatr'. which rvould tunt it
inlo an international fbrurtt along lines sirnilar
to the present OSCE Assenrbly'. and to what thc-
North Atlantic Assembly and. to an extent. tlre
Council of Europe have norv become. Such a
treud should be kept under control, for if it be-
comes dominant the Assentbly u'ill lose its par-
ticularitl, and the possibility it has of invoking
the pouers conf-erred on it by' its orvn statute.
having been the first to infringe it.
86. The Assembll' commands a degree of
aLrthoritl, in def'ence circles on account of the
qualitl of rts work 
- 
in particular the reports it
pLrblishes and the slnrposia it organises (espe-
ciallv on armarnents-related topics). Orving to
the deartlr of otficial docurnentation on E,uro-
pcan defence r.natters. its reports constitutc a
rv'elcorne repositorv of inforrnation fbr special-
ists on sr-rch subjects. It is essential therefbre
that it continue in this vein. retain high-calibre
staff and rnaintain the breadth of docunrentation
it publishes so that its specialisation and use-
fulness are properly appreciated.
81. The \\'EU Assembly. made up as it is of
delegations from its mernber-countr), parlia-
ments 
- 
the onll' parliarnentary assemblies e\-
ercisin-q scrutinl' ol er those nations' military
activities uhile the defence sphere remains the
exclusive pun ieu of nation states 
- 
undoubt-
edll' has inf'luence over those parliaments. al-
22
DOCUMENT I636
though to an extent hard to lneasure, in ternrs of
raising awareuess of the European dimensions
of national defence policres, while at the same
time gil'ing expression to the vielvs of national
parlianrents on issues fallin_e within its remit.
88. For the immediate future. WEU's incor-
poratiou into the ELrropean Union should gLrar-
autee that the deurocratic scrutinl currentlv ex-
ercised by the WEU Assembly continLres. Hou-
ever. according to a vierv that is 'widespread in
rurernber countries. WEU's integration into the
CFSP should lead to the Assernbly' being dis-
solved and the E,uropeau Parlianrent takiug over
its remit''. However it is cornrnon kno*'ledge
that neither Great Britain nor France is readv to
allou the European Parliament a u'ider role in
securitv and defeuce. Cousequently an1' trausfer
of \\IEU's responsibilities to the Europearr
Union is likell' to be achieved at the expense of
democratic control orer E,uropean securitr, and
defeuce activities.
89. In fact, solne sources have it that the pre-
vailing opinion u'ithin govenrnents and aurong
the political leaders concerned rvould scern to
suggest that the scrutinl that national parlia-
ments maintain over thcir respectir e govern-
rnents is quite suff-icient to meet the ueeds of
derrocracy'. That positiou is unacceptable and it
is prinrarilv up to the appropriate parliamentarl'
authorities and the political groups to urake of-
ficial representation to governrnents and the
European institr-rtions to the eff-cct that demo-
cratic scrutiny of any E,uropean defence policl,
must also be carried out at the Er"rropean lel'el.
90. In this connection. reference should be
nrade to another important aspect of the WEU
Assernbly.'s current functions: initiating ELrro-
pean public debate on def'ence issues and keep-
ing public opinion inforrned about the problems
and challenges they present. Bearing in mind
the imporlance and cornplerity of these issues.
there is a need to ensure that this rvork can cou-
tinue in an)' new institutional set-up. In this
connection the Assemblt' can point to the dec-
larations the WEU Council has repeatedlr,' rnade
rvhich. since 198-1. have consistently acknou'-
ledged the irnportancc of the Assembly's con-
tribution to the debate and to the framing of a
European defence policy. The Assembly there-
fore can but urge the Council and the member
governments to act upon those declarations bv
ensuring tlrat. between no\! and the time a final
decision is taken on the arrangerneuts for demo-
cratic scnrtinl'of the future defeuce activities of
the E,uropean Union. that task can continr-rc to
be carried out b1'the Assembly.
91. In point of fact. so long as def-euce. and
decisions regarding the use of arrned fbrces.
remair.r exclusively the responsibilitl, of natiou
states. it is impossible to ask a E,uropean Parl-
ianreut. cousisting of a single chanrber of di-
rectly, elected parliamentart members at E,uro-
pean lel'el, and theretbre not directly ans\\'er-
able to membcr states. to take on the task of
democratic scrutiny.
92. If ue are ultinrately to progress towards a
fuller merger of WEU and tlre European Uniorr.
rnore thorough consideration nrust be gilen to
the firture arrangements for dernocratic scnrtiny'
of Defence E,urope. Mr Fischer. the German
Foreign Affairs Minister. lct his vieu's on the
subject be knorvn in more general terms in arr
irrtervierv rrith the Gerrnarr rveekly Der Spicgcl.
on 23 November 1998. uhen he stated.
"... I rvould slrggest that we need a bi-
carneral Parlianreut in Brussels.
Der Spiegel. Witlr an upper charnber. like
the Bundesrat in Bonn?
Jv[r Fisc'hcr. No. It u'ould be a chanrber of
representatives not of govenrnrents but of
freely-elected nationaI parliarnents. Thel
u'ould produce what lve need most: a
genuineh European public opinion ...
That uoLrld at last do auay' with the ego-
centrisur that so often rears its head. es-
peciallf in European foreign and securit,r'
policy."
93. Political leaders of other countries'3 have
expressed like vieupoints rvithout having as yet
properlv clarified and arnplified their positions.
The tinre has coure for tlre preparaton, rvork to
start on oreanising the parliameutarl dimerrsiou
of the European Union. complete u,rth its de-
fence aspect. The point of view that holds that a
'' See for example Mr Balladur in Le Frguro.l5 Jan-
uary 1999, rvhere he ret-ers to the establrshment of a
Senate of the European Union representing national
legislatures.r See for example Peter Schmidt, op ctt page 18
23
DOCUMENT I636
European Union of highly' divcrsif-ied national
identities 
- 
with a population \\av in excess of
the United States or Russia 
- 
should have a fed-
eral. bicameralll'-based parliaurentan' s1stem is
entirely' defensible in this connection. Alongside
a chaurber directly' representing the electorate
there rnust be a place for one representiue states
through the internrediarl' of their parlrarnents.
The role of such a second chanrber uould be to
saf-eguard the interests of those states iu the face
ol abusive centralist teudencies that rnight find
erpression u'ithin a t-ederal charnber. The re-
sponsibilities of both charnbers would initialll
be deternrined by'the nature of the subjects thel
uere required to deal r''ith. tlte Chamber of
Nations having a greater ueieht of aLrthorit_r in
matters that continued to fhll u ithin the national
rernit. The \\'EU Assembll could legitirnately'
la1' claim to being a fledgling Charnber of
Nations.
94. Within that fiarneu'ork of thirrking. con-
sideration must alstl be eiven to the question of
sLritable procedures to afTord such a Chamber
true dernocratic legitinracy. The Assemblv in its
present form is foundcd on the provisions of an
interuational treatv in which the constitutional
arrangements that appl1, to it are laid dorrn.
Hou'ever. at a later stage. it riill be necessar) to
consider lrore appropriate procedures for the
appointment of rnernbers and the composition
of a firture Chamber of Nations. bearing in nrind
the interesting ideas the Islrtuto 
-1.ffori hrter-
rrct:iorrolr has put foru'ard for increased iu-
volvernent ol rnernbers of the defence commit-
tees of national parliaments.
95. It soes rlithout saf ing tlrat there is no
question of challenging governrnent preroga-
tires iu an! matter relating to thc nesotiation
and conclusion of international treaties. Hou-
ever. in a democratic Europe. suclt prerouatives
primarill' belong to the executive and thc whole
area that surrounds the arraugements fbr derno-
cratic scrutinv has to be u'orked out and decided
on uith the agreemcnt and full inl'olrerrent r-rf
the relevant parliarnentan authorities. This is
all the more impofiant irr r ieu of the fact that
the lreaties on Europc-arr intesration are quitc
different rn kind fronr traditional treaties. as
their aim is to la1, the fcrundations for a Euro-
pean edifice. rvhich. althou-eh withoLrt a true
Coustitlrtirln as such, has at least the makings of
one in the fianrerr'ork of a Union -sui gettct'is.
Consideration r.nr-rst theretbre be given to con-
verting a parlianrentart' conference. uhen the
time coures 
- 
to decide. in broad outline. uhat
the arraugelneuts for democratic scnrtinr over
securitl' and defence Europe are to be 
- 
rvhose
outcome must be taken into account b1, gov-
enrnlents before a decision is reached on the
future parlianrentary' dirnension of tornorrou's
Europe.
6. Prepurutionfor Bremett and Cologne
96. At present rve ha'n,e no information to
hand regarding the detailed content of the pro-
posals to be preseuted to the European Uniorr
Surnmit in Cologne. The most specific ideas are
tho,se put tbnrard bv Germanr's Det-ence Min-
ister. Mr Scharping. uho advocated in an article
published iu the Gerrnan ne\\'spaper Dic Zeit on
I 8 February last. that:
"The political and nrilitary' decision-
rnaking stnrctllres of WELi can be
brought into the E,uropean LInion: its pol-
itical organs sr,rch as the Ministerial
Council. Pernranent Council, Secretariat-
General and Parliarnentar), Assemblr ri ill
thus merge rrith the corresponding EL)
structures and its nrilitarv bodres 
- 
the
Militarl Comnrittee. Planning Cell. Srtua-
tiou Centre and Satellite Centre 
- 
and the
Institute for Securitl'Studies. rvill be
transf-erred to the E,uropean LTuion. uhere
thev wcluld in the future conre under the
responsibilitl of the High Representatir,e
for the CFSP.
Integration of ['EU in the E,uropean
Union requires a decision of principle
liorn the E,uropean Council. uhich should
be takeu at the Cologne Sumrnit. The nec-
essarv detailed arranqements could then
be u'orked out bl the end of 2000. During
this process. tlre question of the Defence
N4inisters' futurc involventent in the EU's
decision-making processes rvould need to
bc clarified. Separate ureetings might also
bc a possibilitl,'. There are difficult prob-
lenrs to be resolred. suclr as the incorpor-
ation of the WELI Treatl, in the EU
Treaties and the ditferent contigr.rrations
of NA'l'O. WEU and the EU. Further der-
elopnrent of Europearr securitv and de-
fence policy must not exclude European
?1
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NATO members which are not members
of the European Union. neither must
European states which are unwilling or
unable to participate in all the steps to-
w'ards EU integration be left out. Further-
more, those countries which do not be-
long to all three institutions must con-
tinue to be entitled to at least the same
levels of participation that are currently
available to them."
97 . This approach could be interpreted as an
argumeut in favour of the second option dis-
cussed in paragraphs 55-58 of the present re-
port, since the Minister says nothing about re-
taining Article V while underlining the abiding
importance of collective defence as a core func-
tion of the Atlarrtic Alliance. The Minister
comes out in favour of strengthening European
intelligence capabilities y'ithn NATO which is
in contradiction with his suggestion for trans-
ferring the WEU Situation Centre and Satellite
Centre to the European Union if, at the same
time. he rejects anl,duplication of NATO struc-
tures.
98. Most other ideas fbrmulated by'the Min-
ister are entirely in line with the concerns ex-
pressed in this report: however it is not knoun
as )'et 'rvhether they will form part of the pro-
posals put forrvard officially by the German
Presidency. The Presidency made the following,
much more general statement in the European
Union framework:
"As far as relations between the European
Union and WEU are concerned. the Am-
sterdam Treatl, envisages WEU's inte-
gration into the European Union as a
long-term objective. Germany' will. dur-
ing its Presidency. take on board the task
described in the Protocol on Article 17 of
the Treaty and endeavour to work out
practical arransetneuts for improving EU/
WEU cooperation and encourage greater
coordination in the policies pursued by
the two Organisations vis-d-vis third
countries".
99. Addressing the European Parliament on
l2 January' 1999, Germany's Minister for For-
eign Affairs, Mr Fischer, made the point, inter
alia lhat:
"The creation of a European Security and
Defence Identity (ESDI) 
- 
after the single
market and Europearr Economic and
Monetary Union 
- 
is of major importance
for the further deepening of the European
Union. We shall actively seek during our
dual EU/WEU presidency to take advan-
tage of this nerv momentum. We intend to
draft a report on the options for subse-
quent development of the ESDI for the
E,uropean Council in Cologne. The long-
term objective of the German Gor.ern-
ment is WEU's integration in the EU (...).
Progress achieved towards building the
ESDI must necessarill' go hand in hand
with a major effort to bolster the demo-
cratic legitimacy and institutions of the
European Union."
100. Speaking at the Munich Conference on
security policy, on 6 February last. Chancellor
Schroder twice referred to Germany,'s resolve to
build a new Europe for a nerv NATO and a new
NATO for a new Europe. He observed firrther-
more that:
"The EU will need political and military
decision-making structures of its orvn. It
will also need to have at its disposal the
instruments required to identify aud man-
age crises.
Of course we are well aware that not all
European countries enjoy the salrre mem-
bership status in the EU, WEU and
NATO. And on no account do we want to
dupl icate existing structures.
What we rr'ant is the creation of efficient
structures and instruments which make
possible closer and better coordination
among Europeans themselves and with
their North American partners."
101. In the WEU framework, the German
Presidency's programme. rvhich was presented
to a number of WEU Assembly committees. in
Brussels, on 4 February 1999. focuses more par-
ticularly on the following points:
moving forward the informal reflec-
tion process on security and defence
initiated in Rome in order to re-exam-
ine revised proposals at the WEU
ministerial meeting. scheduled to be
held in Bremen on l0 and 1l May, so
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that these can be submitted to the
European Union Summit in Cologne:
meanwhile, arrange for an audit of as-
sets available for European operations;
finalise the arrangements for enhanced
cooperation between the European
Union and WEU, as provided in the
Protocol to Article 17 of the Amster-
dam Treaty, so that these can take ef-
fect at the same time as the Treaty
comes into forcel
strengthen associate partner involve-
ment in WEU's work.
102. The German Presidency has given no hint
as to what its proposed approach might consist
of. Some governments. however, for example
that of Italy, have let their preference be known.
The Italian Prime Minister, Mr D'Alema'' pub-
licly threw his weight behind direct links be-
tween NATO and the European Union by
gradually integrating WEU into European
Union structures. In this connection. the Italians
seem to favour the idea of WEU being
transformed into a specialist agency of the
European Union, along the lines of the ECSC or
Euratom, operating in specific sectors in the
framework of the common institutions. Political
decision-making would be transferred to the
European Union by merging the WEU Minister-
ial and Permanent Councils. Parliamentary As-
sembly and Secretariat with the corresponding
EU bodies. The Agency. while avoiding any
needless duplication. would keep WEU's perm-
anent military structure. including the Military
Committee, the Situation Centre and the Plan-
ning Cell, the Torrej6n Satellite Centre and the
Institute for Security Studies in Paris.
103. Under the Italian scheme of things the
Agency would have the follorving tasks:
executing political and strategic deci-
sions made in the CFSP framework,
providing CFSP decision-making bod-
ies with complete operational auto-
nomy as far as the Petersberg opera-
tions are concerned by making use of
resources made available by member
p 
See the Internattonal Herald Trtbune,22 January
1999: Italy, Europe and the new NATO.
countries and/or of those existing in
the framework of multinational forces,
obtaining access to NATO intelli-
gence, analysis, planning and com-
mand capabilities;
ensuring the coordination and interop-
erability of forces to be deployed in
European operations:
coordinating cooperation and integra-
tion of Europe's defence industry.
104. The Italians take the view that in the
spirit of the Amsterdam Treaty, all defence
matters would become an integral part of the
CFSP, the European Commission being asso-
ciated with it in the usual way. The principle of
enhanced cooperation. which in the Arnsterdam
Treaty refers to community matters only, rvould
be extended to defence matters. Ad hoc arrange-
ments would take care of access by European
countries, members of NATO but not of the
European Union. as well as by central and
eastern European countries to the EU decision-
making process and to the operational mech-
anisms.
105. Within the European Union, decision-
making concerning principles and general orien-
tations in defence matters should remain in the
hands of the European Council. The General
Affairs Council of Ministers would be endowed
with a political-military expertise not only by'
the inclusion in it of "Mr/s CFSP". but also by
the establishrnent of a "Defence Council of the
European Union" composed of EU foreign af-
fairs and defence ministers. This Council would
take decisions concerning military operations
and would ensure the political-rnilitary direction
of the Agency and the management of crises.
106. The ideas put forward here by Italy are
very close to those expressed by Mr Scharping
but. if anything. go even further. They do not,
horvever. address the problem of Article V or of
the future of the modified Brussels Treaty as a
whole. It would appear that the preparatory
rvork for Bremen and Cologne is mainly being
conducted in a very narrow framework, involv-
ing Britain and France, where work is being
done on proposals that draw their inspiration
from Saint Malo in extremely close cooperation
and consultation with the Gerrnan Presidency. If
this leads to a convergence of views between
26
DOCUMENT I636
those three nations, the likelihood of a consen-
sus being arrived at in WEU and the European
Union is then much greater. However, it would
be highly desirable, in order to avoid other
countries concerned having the impression of
being dictated to by some sort of three-way
management team. for discussion on the pre-
liminaries to take place at a sufficiently early
date in the appropriate forums, parlicularly
WEU. For the moment it seems that things will
remain in the air until after NATO's Washing-
ton Summit. A contribution from the Assembly
to the decision-making process would therefore
be timely.
VI. Conclusions
101. The questions WEU's possible integra-
tion into the European Union raises are of con-
siderable consequence and there has recently
been ample evidence to suggest that certain
governments concerned could, in order to side-
step or avoid cerlain difficulties altogether, in-
creasirrgly be ternpted to look for seemingly
simple solutions rvhich will not address the
basic problems and may put the European de-
fence project under threat. Contrary to expec-
tation, there is a tendency to want quick action,
with the consequent danger that insufficient
time will be given to detailed analysis of all the
complex ramifications of such an undertaking.
108. There are therefore any number of rea-
sons for the Assembly to be on its guard and to
show that it intends to take matters in hand. as a
matter of course 
- 
and for it to make clear the
full extent of the problems that are being raised.
It should continue to defend the project of a
E,uropean defence dimension by taking an Lln-
equivocal stance in favour of WEU's integration
in the European Union, provided that such a
course serves to advance that project and that
WEU achievemeuts are a part of it.
109. Under tlre present circumstances. this
means the Assembly advocating a process
which takes full advantage of all that WEU and
its Treaty today represent. thereby ensuring
continuity of the democratic scrutiny and public
debate hitherto guaranteed by the Assembly. It
must continue to spell out the advantages appli-
cation of the Treaty can have for European se-
curity, particularly when used in the service of
the European Union. as opposed to a process
that seeks to base the defence debate on struc-
tures that have yet to be created, thus risking
dilution and fragmelttation of the entire project.
110. The Assembly is fully in agreement with
WEU's being integrated into the European
Union provided this hastens progress towards a
European defence and the achievements of
WEU and its Treaty are integral to it. The As-
sembly can therefore endorse the transfer of
everything that makes up WEU today, for
Europe's benefit and to ensure better organisa-
tion of Europe's defence. However it feels that
it will take time for a common defence to take
shape and, in the meantime, WEU as it is at pre-
sent (under that name or another) can play a
most imporlant par1. What is involved is the
transfer to the European Union of all WEU's
structures and decision-making capability. in
their entirety. usirrg the machinery provided un-
der the Amsterdam Treaty to the full. In prac-
tice, everything established under the rnodified
Brussels Treaty could be made available to the
European Union. and WEU, as an institution,
remain virtually intact. WEU would thus be-
come the defence dimension of the European
Union in the fullest sense. It must be empha-
sised that it is perfectly possible to implement
the Saint Malo agreements by drawing on eve-
ry'thing available under the modified Brussels
Treaty and the instrument to hand in WEU.
1 1 1. If governments are intent on furthering
the process of integrating WEU into the Euro-
pean Union, the European Council could take a
decision of principle to that effect at the Col-
ogne Summit, provided consensus among Euro-
peans is strong enough for them to forge res-
olutely ahead torvards European defence. How-
ever, implementing that process would require
finding solutions to numerous problems, rvhich
could be done by stages. as follows:
in the short term: the Saint Malo ag-
reements must be firmed Lrp. there has
to be consolidation of the Amsterdam
Treaty, a start made in applying the
decisions it embodies and a process of
institutional adjustrnent set in train
under the terms set out in this docu-
ment;
in the medium terrn: cooperation be-
tween WEU and the European Union
must be strengtl-rened within the
2l
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framework of an integration process
which would move forward in step
with EU enlargement:






rvith WEU fully inte-
European Union and im-






foint Declaration on European defence
Saint Mulo, I Decentber 1998
"The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom are agreed that:
l. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international
stage. This means rnaking a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which u,ill provide the es-
sential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid irnplemen-
tation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European
Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence poticy in the framework
of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering
the whole range of activity set out in Title v of the Treaty of European Union.
2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action. backed up by
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so. in order to
respond to international crises.
In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to rvhich member states sub-
scribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty,) must
be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European
Union. in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs. while acting in con-
formity with our respective obligations in NATO. we are contribLrting to the vitality of a
modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its mem-
bers.
Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the E,uropean Union (European
Council. General Affairs Council and meetings of Defence Ministers).
The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of
European states.
The different situations of countries in relation to NATo must be respected.
3. In order forthe European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the
Alliance as a rvhole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a cap-
acity for analvsis of situations. sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic
planning. without unnecessary duplication. taking account of the existing assets of the WEU
and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also
need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within
NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO
framework).
4. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks. and
which are supported by'a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.
5. We are determined to unite in our efforts to enable the European Union to give concrete
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